Disinformation in Poland: Daily Risk Assessment, 13 November 2026

Updated: 3 hours ago
Executive summary. This page is a short public summary of our complete special report, Disinformation in Poland: Daily Assessment, updated every day at 20:00 CET. The full report adds what this page leaves out: ratings for five threat axes, Admiralty and impact ratings for source categories from Poland, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Western Europe, the US, the Baltic and Nordic states and others, a narrative and claim register, and a seven-day forecast with scenarios. It is available in two editions, delivered by email within 2 hours of payment:
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Assessment of 13 November 2026, 19:45 CET, covering the seven days from 7 to 13 November. Updated daily at 20:00 CET.
The information contest in Poland moved from the streets to the law on 13 November. The head of state vetoed the second bill implementing the EU Digital Services Act. The bill would have allowed the telecoms regulator to order the blocking of listed categories of illegal content online. The head of state called it censorship and said only courts should decide what is unlawful. Ministers called the veto a "black day" for online safety. Poland therefore still has no national procedure for ordering the removal of illegal content. Its response to waves like the one after the Kraków attack continues to depend on platforms acting on notifications.
Three other developments stood out in the last 24 hours. First, prosecutors indicted a Ukrainian national for helping two men working for Russian intelligence prepare the November 2025 explosion on the Warsaw–Lublin railway line. The two men are reported to have fled to Belarus. Second, in the Kraków investigation prosecutors said they had established the attacker's route without disclosing it. An official said a Ukrainian national detained over posts about the attack is to be expelled. Third, fact-checkers debunked another fabricated quote attributed to a Ukrainian politician, this one claiming that Polish healthcare survives only thanks to Ukrainian doctors.
Our assessment is unchanged: the overall risk of disinformation in Poland is HIGH and stable, and the risk that it leads to offline harm is ELEVATED. The trend in the politics area is now rising.

Key findings
The content-blocking veto is becoming a disinformation topic in its own right. One camp frames the law as state censorship. The other frames the veto as protection for criminals and foreign bot networks. Both versions are spreading in absolute terms.
The railway indictment gives anti-Ukrainian content a new hook. The indicted man helped men working for Russian intelligence, but the case is likely to be recycled as "Ukrainian sabotage" ahead of the 16 November anniversary.
The Kraków case may produce a second anti-Ukrainian wave. The planned expulsion of a Ukrainian detainee is a realistic hook for claims that Ukrainians drove the disinformation after the attack. The attacker is a Polish citizen.
Fabricated quotes of Ukrainian officials remain a steady technique. They are cheap to produce and are usually debunked only after they have spread.
No disinformation-driven incident was reported. The state continues to function normally. The main cost is to trust in institutions and to Polish–Ukrainian relations.
Ratings by threat area
Area | Rating | Trend | Main drivers |
Russian propaganda and sabotage | HIGH | Rising | Railway indictment; espionage claim; "Poland prepares war" framing |
Kraków attack and 11 November | HIGH | Easing | Kraków investigation; planned expulsion; turnout dispute fading |
Ukrainians in Poland | HIGH | Stable | Sabotage framing; fabricated quotes; Kraków expulsion |
Security, NATO and the border | ELEVATED | Rising | Drone alerts; Kaliningrad border operation; BRAVO alert |
Politics and the EU | ELEVATED | Rising | Content-blocking veto; Constitutional Tribunal dispute |
Which sources carry the risk
Source category | Reliability | Impact in Poland |
Russian state media and officials | Unreliable | HIGH |
Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels, Russian and Polish-language | Unreliable | HIGH |
Anonymous accounts with bot-like patterns | Cannot be judged | HIGH |
Polish hyper-partisan portals and influencers | Not usually reliable | HIGH |
Polish politicians (some, all camps) | Fairly reliable | ELEVATED |
Belarusian state media | Unreliable | ELEVATED |
Polish, Western and Nordic public broadcasters and wires | Usually reliable | LOW |
What was claimed in the last 24 hours
Claim | Status | What is established |
A Ukrainian politician wrote that Polish healthcare survives only thanks to Ukrainians | Fabricated | No such post exists, per fact-checkers |
Railway sabotage is proof of "Ukrainian" hostility | Misleading | The indicted man helped men working for Russian intelligence |
The vetoed law would have let officials censor lawful speech | Contested | It targeted listed illegal content, with appeal; the head of state says only courts may decide |
The veto leaves Poland with no way to remove illegal content | Misleading | Existing laws and platform notice systems still apply; there is no national order-to-block procedure |
Half a million or more marched in Warsaw | Unverified | The city estimates up to 250,000 |
A Polish spy network was uncovered in the Kaliningrad region | Unverified | Russian security service claim; Polish officials call it a provocation |
Seven-day forecast
Window | Rating | Main drivers |
14 November | HIGH | Veto fallout; Kraków investigation and expulsion |
15 to 17 November | HIGH | Railway sabotage anniversary (16 November) and indictment; Tribunal developments |
18 to 20 November | ELEVATED | Government response to the veto; sabotage case hearings; any drone incident |
Most likely (60 to 70 percent): attention moves to the veto, the Tribunal and the railway case. Anti-Ukrainian content stays high but without a new trigger. No disinformation-driven violence.
Most dangerous (10 to 20 percent): a new incident is falsely blamed on Ukrainians within hours, backed by AI fakes. Protests or attacks on Ukrainians follow before the facts are known.
Likely propaganda directions: "censorship" around the veto; "Ukrainian saboteurs" around the railway anniversary; "Poland the aggressor" around espionage claims; "NATO is useless" after any drone event.
Practical points for organisations in Poland
Treat first reports of attacks, explosions, drones or arrests as unverified until police, prosecutors, the city or the armed forces confirm them.
Expect slower removal of harmful content about your organisation: report it to the platform and keep evidence, because no national blocking order is available.
Be careful with quotes attributed to foreign officials. Check the original post before sharing or reacting.
Ask staff not to repost unverified claims, especially those that blame a nationality.
Previous assessment: Disinformation in Poland: Daily Risk Assessment, 12 November 2026. Earlier: 11 November 2026.
Full situation report This page is a public summary. Our complete report, with a detailed chronology, threat ratings by location and time window, conflicting claims and a forecast, is available to organisations and private clients in two editions, delivered by email within 2 hours of payment:
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