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Disinformation in Poland: Daily Risk Assessment, 13 November 2026

Writer: Justyna Nowak
Justyna Nowak
Nov 13
5 min read

Updated: 3 hours ago

Executive summary. This page is a short public summary of our complete special report, Disinformation in Poland: Daily Assessment, updated every day at 20:00 CET. The full report adds what this page leaves out: ratings for five threat axes, Admiralty and impact ratings for source categories from Poland, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Western Europe, the US, the Baltic and Nordic states and others, a narrative and claim register, and a seven-day forecast with scenarios. It is available in two editions, delivered by email within 2 hours of payment:

  • White-label edition: an editable Word document and PDF without our branding. Add your own logo and brief your team or your clients under your own name. Order white-label edition →

  • GSC-branded edition: a protected PDF issued under the GSC name, ready to forward to decision-makers as it stands. Order GSC-branded edition →

  • Custom report: your own topic and region, country or city, from EUR 210 net, delivered within 6 hours. Order a custom report →


Assessment of 13 November 2026, 19:45 CET, covering the seven days from 7 to 13 November. Updated daily at 20:00 CET.


The information contest in Poland moved from the streets to the law on 13 November. The head of state vetoed the second bill implementing the EU Digital Services Act. The bill would have allowed the telecoms regulator to order the blocking of listed categories of illegal content online. The head of state called it censorship and said only courts should decide what is unlawful. Ministers called the veto a "black day" for online safety. Poland therefore still has no national procedure for ordering the removal of illegal content. Its response to waves like the one after the Kraków attack continues to depend on platforms acting on notifications.


Three other developments stood out in the last 24 hours. First, prosecutors indicted a Ukrainian national for helping two men working for Russian intelligence prepare the November 2025 explosion on the Warsaw–Lublin railway line. The two men are reported to have fled to Belarus. Second, in the Kraków investigation prosecutors said they had established the attacker's route without disclosing it. An official said a Ukrainian national detained over posts about the attack is to be expelled. Third, fact-checkers debunked another fabricated quote attributed to a Ukrainian politician, this one claiming that Polish healthcare survives only thanks to Ukrainian doctors.


Our assessment is unchanged: the overall risk of disinformation in Poland is HIGH and stable, and the risk that it leads to offline harm is ELEVATED. The trend in the politics area is now rising.


Black-and-white night view of Warsaw from the International Space Station with a red stamp reading DISINFORMATION ALERT, UPDATE 13 NOV 19:45 CET

Key findings

  • The content-blocking veto is becoming a disinformation topic in its own right. One camp frames the law as state censorship. The other frames the veto as protection for criminals and foreign bot networks. Both versions are spreading in absolute terms.

  • The railway indictment gives anti-Ukrainian content a new hook. The indicted man helped men working for Russian intelligence, but the case is likely to be recycled as "Ukrainian sabotage" ahead of the 16 November anniversary.

  • The Kraków case may produce a second anti-Ukrainian wave. The planned expulsion of a Ukrainian detainee is a realistic hook for claims that Ukrainians drove the disinformation after the attack. The attacker is a Polish citizen.

  • Fabricated quotes of Ukrainian officials remain a steady technique. They are cheap to produce and are usually debunked only after they have spread.

  • No disinformation-driven incident was reported. The state continues to function normally. The main cost is to trust in institutions and to Polish–Ukrainian relations.


Ratings by threat area

Area

Rating

Trend

Main drivers

Russian propaganda and sabotage

HIGH

Rising

Railway indictment; espionage claim; "Poland prepares war" framing

Kraków attack and 11 November

HIGH

Easing

Kraków investigation; planned expulsion; turnout dispute fading

Ukrainians in Poland

HIGH

Stable

Sabotage framing; fabricated quotes; Kraków expulsion

Security, NATO and the border

ELEVATED

Rising

Drone alerts; Kaliningrad border operation; BRAVO alert

Politics and the EU

ELEVATED

Rising

Content-blocking veto; Constitutional Tribunal dispute


Which sources carry the risk

Source category

Reliability

Impact in Poland

Russian state media and officials

Unreliable

HIGH

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels, Russian and Polish-language

Unreliable

HIGH

Anonymous accounts with bot-like patterns

Cannot be judged

HIGH

Polish hyper-partisan portals and influencers

Not usually reliable

HIGH

Polish politicians (some, all camps)

Fairly reliable

ELEVATED

Belarusian state media

Unreliable

ELEVATED

Polish, Western and Nordic public broadcasters and wires

Usually reliable

LOW


What was claimed in the last 24 hours

Claim

Status

What is established

A Ukrainian politician wrote that Polish healthcare survives only thanks to Ukrainians

Fabricated

No such post exists, per fact-checkers

Railway sabotage is proof of "Ukrainian" hostility

Misleading

The indicted man helped men working for Russian intelligence

The vetoed law would have let officials censor lawful speech

Contested

It targeted listed illegal content, with appeal; the head of state says only courts may decide

The veto leaves Poland with no way to remove illegal content

Misleading

Existing laws and platform notice systems still apply; there is no national order-to-block procedure

Half a million or more marched in Warsaw

Unverified

The city estimates up to 250,000

A Polish spy network was uncovered in the Kaliningrad region

Unverified

Russian security service claim; Polish officials call it a provocation


Seven-day forecast

Window

Rating

Main drivers

14 November

HIGH

Veto fallout; Kraków investigation and expulsion

15 to 17 November

HIGH

Railway sabotage anniversary (16 November) and indictment; Tribunal developments

18 to 20 November

ELEVATED

Government response to the veto; sabotage case hearings; any drone incident


  • Most likely (60 to 70 percent): attention moves to the veto, the Tribunal and the railway case. Anti-Ukrainian content stays high but without a new trigger. No disinformation-driven violence.

  • Most dangerous (10 to 20 percent): a new incident is falsely blamed on Ukrainians within hours, backed by AI fakes. Protests or attacks on Ukrainians follow before the facts are known.

  • Likely propaganda directions: "censorship" around the veto; "Ukrainian saboteurs" around the railway anniversary; "Poland the aggressor" around espionage claims; "NATO is useless" after any drone event.


Practical points for organisations in Poland

  • Treat first reports of attacks, explosions, drones or arrests as unverified until police, prosecutors, the city or the armed forces confirm them.

  • Expect slower removal of harmful content about your organisation: report it to the platform and keep evidence, because no national blocking order is available.

  • Be careful with quotes attributed to foreign officials. Check the original post before sharing or reacting.

  • Ask staff not to repost unverified claims, especially those that blame a nationality.


Full situation report

This page is a public summary. Our complete report, with a detailed chronology, threat ratings by location and time window, conflicting claims and a forecast, is available to organisations and private clients in two editions, delivered by email within 2 hours of payment:

  • White-label edition: an editable document without GSC branding, ready for your own logo, to brief your team or your clients under your own name.

  • GSC-branded edition: a protected PDF issued under the GSC name, with editing and text copying disabled.

  • Custom report: your own topic and region, country or city, from EUR 210 net (+EUR 70 per additional topic, region or field), delivered by email within 6 hours of payment.




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