Disinformation in Poland: Daily Risk Assessment, 12 November 2026

Updated: 12 minutes ago
Executive summary. This page is a short public summary of our complete special report, Disinformation in Poland: Daily Assessment, updated every day at 20:00 CET. The full report adds what this page leaves out: ratings for five threat axes, Admiralty and impact ratings for source categories from Poland, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Western Europe, the US, the Baltic and Nordic states and others, a narrative and claim register, and a seven-day forecast with scenarios. It is available in two editions, delivered by email within 2 hours of payment:
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Assessment of 12 November 2026, 19:45 CET, covering the seven days from 6 to 12 November. Updated daily at 20:00 CET.
The day after Independence Day was quiet on the streets, and the information contest moved to numbers, images and accountability. The interior ministry put the total detained at the Warsaw march at 66, of whom 44 were held for drug possession. No charges had been announced by the evening, and no incident driven by disinformation was reported.
Three developments stood out in the last 24 hours. First, an AI-generated panorama of a packed central Warsaw was posted by two opposition politicians as a photograph of the march. Fact-checkers concluded that the image had been generated or altered by artificial intelligence; one of the posts was removed, the other was still online in the evening. Second, regional prosecutors in Kraków opened a criminal investigation into remarks made during a private broadcaster's live coverage of the 7 November attack, including a claim that police were absent from the Main Square and a claim that foreigners took part. It is the first criminal step taken against a media-borne falsehood in this wave. Third, the Russian security service's espionage claim of 11 November produced no new official detail; Polish officials maintain that it was a provocation timed to the national holiday.
Our assessment is unchanged: the overall risk of disinformation in Poland is HIGH and stable, and the risk that it leads to offline harm is ELEVATED.

Key findings
Domestic politicians remain the first carriers of synthetic media. The AI-generated march image followed the same pattern as the Kraków wave, where domestic actors started falsehoods and foreign networks scaled them.
The state is moving from denial to enforcement. Moderation requests, detentions for online threats and now a criminal investigation into broadcast claims show a firmer response.
The turnout dispute is the main 11 November narrative. The city's estimate of up to 250,000 is set against organisers' claims of half a million or more.
The anti-Ukrainian strand stays the most dangerous. The false claim that foreigners took part in the Kraków attack is now under investigation, but it remains in circulation.
Russia keeps the "Poland the aggressor" frame active. The espionage claim remains unverified and is likely to be followed by further mirror claims.
Ratings by threat area
Area | Rating | Trend | Main drivers |
Russian propaganda and sabotage | HIGH | Rising | Espionage claim; sabotage charges; "Poland prepares war" framing |
Kraków attack and 11 November | HIGH | Easing | Broadcast investigation; turnout dispute; AI march image |
Ukrainians in Poland | HIGH | Stable | False attribution of crimes; "foreigners in Kraków" claim |
Security, NATO and the border | ELEVATED | Rising | Drone alerts; Kaliningrad border operation; BRAVO alert |
Politics and the EU | ELEVATED | Stable | Constitutional Tribunal dispute; sovereignty themes |
Which sources carry the risk
Source category | Reliability | Impact in Poland |
Russian state media and officials | Unreliable | HIGH |
Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels, Russian and Polish-language | Unreliable | HIGH |
Anonymous accounts with bot-like patterns | Cannot be judged | HIGH |
Polish hyper-partisan portals and influencers | Not usually reliable | HIGH |
Polish politicians (some, all camps) | Fairly reliable | ELEVATED |
Belarusian state media | Unreliable | ELEVATED |
Polish, Western and Nordic public broadcasters and wires | Usually reliable | LOW |
What was claimed in the last 24 hours
Claim | Status | What is established |
Photo of a record crowd in central Warsaw | Fabricated | Generated or altered by AI, per fact-checkers |
Police were absent from the Main Square during the Kraków attack | False | Officers engaged the attacker and two were wounded; under criminal investigation |
Foreigners took part in the Kraków attack | False | The attacker is a Polish citizen; under criminal investigation |
Half a million or more marched in Warsaw | Unverified | The city estimates up to 250,000 |
The march ended in riots | False | 66 detained, mostly for drugs; no injuries reported |
A Polish spy network was uncovered in the Kaliningrad region | Unverified | Russian security service claim; Polish officials call it a provocation |
Seven-day forecast
Window | Rating | Main drivers |
13 November | HIGH | Charges after 11 November; turnout dispute; AI image dispute |
14 to 16 November | HIGH | Kraków investigations; Tribunal developments; railway sabotage anniversary |
17 to 19 November | ELEVATED | Sabotage case hearings; any drone incident |
Most likely (60 to 70 percent): attention shifts to the Tribunal, charging decisions and espionage claims; anti-Ukrainian content stays high; no disinformation-driven violence.
Most dangerous (10 to 20 percent): a new incident is falsely blamed on Ukrainians within hours, backed by AI fakes, leading to protests or attacks on Ukrainians before facts are known.
Likely propaganda directions: "Poland the aggressor" around espionage claims; "the state silences critics" around the broadcast investigation; "NATO is useless" after any drone event.
Practical points for organisations in Poland
Treat first reports of attacks, explosions, drones or arrests as unverified until police, prosecutors, the city or the armed forces confirm them.
Check striking crowd or incident images before sharing; AI-generated pictures are now posted by public figures.
Ask staff not to repost unverified claims, especially those that blame a nationality.
Watch for impersonation of executives and officials with AI-generated audio or video.
Previous assessment: Disinformation in Poland: Daily Risk Assessment, 11 November 2026. Related: 11 November 2026 Warsaw March: Risk Assessment, 12 November 10:45.
Full situation report This page is a public summary. Our complete report, with a detailed chronology, threat ratings by location and time window, conflicting claims and a forecast, is available to organisations and private clients in two editions, delivered by email within 2 hours of payment:
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