Disinformation in Poland: Daily Risk Assessment, 11 November 2026

Updated: 3 hours ago
Executive summary. This page is a short public summary of our complete special report, Disinformation in Poland: Daily Assessment, updated every day at 20:00 CET. The full report adds what this page leaves out: ratings for five threat axes, Admiralty and impact ratings for source categories from Poland, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Western Europe, the US, the Baltic and Nordic states and others, a narrative and claim register, and a seven-day forecast with scenarios. It is available in two editions, delivered by email within 2 hours of payment:
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Assessment of 11 November 2026, 19:45 CET, covering the seven days to date. This is the first edition of a daily series, updated at 20:00 CET.
Poland's Independence Day passed without a major security incident, but not without an information attack. Within hours of the morning ceremonies, the Russian security service announced that it had detained two Polish citizens in the Kaliningrad region for espionage and had "warned" seven more. Polish officials described the announcement as a provocation and disinformation timed to the national holiday, and the foreign ministry said it was verifying the claim.
The week was dominated by the attack in Kraków's Main Square on 7 November. It produced the largest single wave of disinformation in Poland this year. Between 7 and 10 November the national cyber-security institute passed 4,795 items to platforms for moderation, more than 2,000 accounts were reported, and the leading false theories drew over 200 million views. The main false claims were that the attacker was Ukrainian, that the government or the EU organised the attack, and that it was staged with actors. All three are false: the attacker is a Polish citizen.
Our assessment: the overall risk of disinformation in Poland is HIGH and stable after the peak of 7 to 10 November, and the risk that it leads to offline harm is ELEVATED.

Key findings
Russia is the main external driver. It works through state media, Telegram networks and bot accounts posting in several languages. Domestic political actors and anonymous accounts do much of the amplification.
The anti-Ukrainian narrative is the most dangerous strand. It links Kraków, the march motto, sabotage cases and migration, and it has a direct path to harassment and violence.
Sabotage and disinformation are now one operation. Two Ukrainian nationals were charged on 10 November with spying and sabotage for Russian intelligence, including burning cars with Ukrainian-style plates to stir hostility toward Ukrainians.
The state functioned normally. Police, the city and ministries issued denials quickly. The real cost is to public trust and to Polish–Ukrainian relations.
Synthetic media is now routine. AI-generated video of the Kraków attacker and AI-made statements attributed to Ukrainian officials appeared in recent weeks.
Ratings by threat area
Area | Rating | Trend | Main drivers |
Russian propaganda and sabotage | HIGH | Rising | Espionage claim timed to 11 November; sabotage charges |
Kraków attack and 11 November | HIGH | Easing | Kraków wave past its peak; turnout and banner disputes |
Ukrainians in Poland | HIGH | Stable | False attribution of crimes; AI fakes; march motto |
Security, NATO and the border | ELEVATED | Rising | Overnight drone alerts; Kaliningrad border operation |
Politics and the EU | ELEVATED | Stable | Constitutional Tribunal dispute; sovereignty themes |
Which sources carry the risk
Source category | Reliability | Impact in Poland |
Russian state media and officials | Unreliable | HIGH |
Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels, Russian and Polish-language | Unreliable | HIGH |
Anonymous accounts with bot-like patterns | Cannot be judged | HIGH |
Polish hyper-partisan portals and influencers | Not usually reliable | HIGH |
Belarusian state media | Unreliable | ELEVATED |
US partisan influencers | Not usually reliable | ELEVATED |
Polish, Western and Nordic public broadcasters and wires | Usually reliable | LOW |
What was claimed in the last 24 hours
Claim | Status | What is established |
A Polish spy network was uncovered in the Kaliningrad region | Unverified | Russian security service claim; Polish officials call it a provocation |
Half a million or more marched in Warsaw | Unverified | The city estimates up to 250,000 |
There were riots at the march | False | The city reports no incidents |
Ukrainians planned attacks on the march | Distorted | Two of eight people detained for online threats were Ukrainian nationals |
Russian drones hit Poland overnight | Unverified | Alerts were reported in the region; origin not established; no damage reported |
Seven-day forecast
Window | Rating | Main drivers |
12 November | HIGH | Police summary of 11 November; turnout dispute; espionage claim |
13 to 15 November | HIGH | Kraków investigation; Tribunal developments; sabotage hearings |
16 to 18 November | ELEVATED | Anniversary of the 2025 railway sabotage; any drone incident |
Most likely (60 to 70 percent): attention shifts to the Tribunal, turnout and espionage claims; anti-Ukrainian content stays high; no disinformation-driven violence.
Most dangerous (10 to 20 percent): a new incident is falsely blamed on Ukrainians within hours, backed by AI fakes, leading to protests or attacks on Ukrainians before facts are known.
Likely propaganda directions: "Poland the aggressor" around the espionage claims; "the state lies" around Kraków; "NATO is useless" after any drone event.
Practical points for organisations in Poland
Treat first reports of attacks, explosions, drones or arrests as unverified until police, prosecutors, the city or the armed forces confirm them.
Ask staff not to repost unverified claims, especially those that blame a nationality.
Give Ukrainian and other foreign staff a clear route to report harassment, and review travel near demonstrations.
Watch for impersonation of executives and officials with AI-generated audio or video.
Full situation report This page is a public summary. Our complete report, with a detailed chronology, threat ratings by location and time window, conflicting claims and a forecast, is available to organisations and private clients in two editions, delivered by email within 2 hours of payment:
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