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Disinformation in Poland: Daily Risk Assessment, 11 November 2026

Writer: Justyna Nowak
Justyna Nowak
Nov 11
4 min read

Updated: 3 hours ago

Executive summary. This page is a short public summary of our complete special report, Disinformation in Poland: Daily Assessment, updated every day at 20:00 CET. The full report adds what this page leaves out: ratings for five threat axes, Admiralty and impact ratings for source categories from Poland, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Western Europe, the US, the Baltic and Nordic states and others, a narrative and claim register, and a seven-day forecast with scenarios. It is available in two editions, delivered by email within 2 hours of payment:

  • White-label edition: an editable Word document and PDF without our branding. Add your own logo and brief your team or your clients under your own name. Order white-label edition →

  • GSC-branded edition: a protected PDF issued under the GSC name, ready to forward to decision-makers as it stands. Order GSC-branded edition →

  • Custom report: your own topic and region, country or city, from EUR 210 net, delivered within 6 hours. Order a custom report →


Assessment of 11 November 2026, 19:45 CET, covering the seven days to date. This is the first edition of a daily series, updated at 20:00 CET.


Poland's Independence Day passed without a major security incident, but not without an information attack. Within hours of the morning ceremonies, the Russian security service announced that it had detained two Polish citizens in the Kaliningrad region for espionage and had "warned" seven more. Polish officials described the announcement as a provocation and disinformation timed to the national holiday, and the foreign ministry said it was verifying the claim.


The week was dominated by the attack in Kraków's Main Square on 7 November. It produced the largest single wave of disinformation in Poland this year. Between 7 and 10 November the national cyber-security institute passed 4,795 items to platforms for moderation, more than 2,000 accounts were reported, and the leading false theories drew over 200 million views. The main false claims were that the attacker was Ukrainian, that the government or the EU organised the attack, and that it was staged with actors. All three are false: the attacker is a Polish citizen.


Our assessment: the overall risk of disinformation in Poland is HIGH and stable after the peak of 7 to 10 November, and the risk that it leads to offline harm is ELEVATED.


Black-and-white night view of Warsaw from the International Space Station with a red stamp reading DISINFORMATION ALERT, UPDATE 11 NOV 19:45 CET

Key findings

  • Russia is the main external driver. It works through state media, Telegram networks and bot accounts posting in several languages. Domestic political actors and anonymous accounts do much of the amplification.

  • The anti-Ukrainian narrative is the most dangerous strand. It links Kraków, the march motto, sabotage cases and migration, and it has a direct path to harassment and violence.

  • Sabotage and disinformation are now one operation. Two Ukrainian nationals were charged on 10 November with spying and sabotage for Russian intelligence, including burning cars with Ukrainian-style plates to stir hostility toward Ukrainians.

  • The state functioned normally. Police, the city and ministries issued denials quickly. The real cost is to public trust and to Polish–Ukrainian relations.

  • Synthetic media is now routine. AI-generated video of the Kraków attacker and AI-made statements attributed to Ukrainian officials appeared in recent weeks.


Ratings by threat area

Area

Rating

Trend

Main drivers

Russian propaganda and sabotage

HIGH

Rising

Espionage claim timed to 11 November; sabotage charges

Kraków attack and 11 November

HIGH

Easing

Kraków wave past its peak; turnout and banner disputes

Ukrainians in Poland

HIGH

Stable

False attribution of crimes; AI fakes; march motto

Security, NATO and the border

ELEVATED

Rising

Overnight drone alerts; Kaliningrad border operation

Politics and the EU

ELEVATED

Stable

Constitutional Tribunal dispute; sovereignty themes


Which sources carry the risk

Source category

Reliability

Impact in Poland

Russian state media and officials

Unreliable

HIGH

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels, Russian and Polish-language

Unreliable

HIGH

Anonymous accounts with bot-like patterns

Cannot be judged

HIGH

Polish hyper-partisan portals and influencers

Not usually reliable

HIGH

Belarusian state media

Unreliable

ELEVATED

US partisan influencers

Not usually reliable

ELEVATED

Polish, Western and Nordic public broadcasters and wires

Usually reliable

LOW


What was claimed in the last 24 hours

Claim

Status

What is established

A Polish spy network was uncovered in the Kaliningrad region

Unverified

Russian security service claim; Polish officials call it a provocation

Half a million or more marched in Warsaw

Unverified

The city estimates up to 250,000

There were riots at the march

False

The city reports no incidents

Ukrainians planned attacks on the march

Distorted

Two of eight people detained for online threats were Ukrainian nationals

Russian drones hit Poland overnight

Unverified

Alerts were reported in the region; origin not established; no damage reported


Seven-day forecast

Window

Rating

Main drivers

12 November

HIGH

Police summary of 11 November; turnout dispute; espionage claim

13 to 15 November

HIGH

Kraków investigation; Tribunal developments; sabotage hearings

16 to 18 November

ELEVATED

Anniversary of the 2025 railway sabotage; any drone incident


  • Most likely (60 to 70 percent): attention shifts to the Tribunal, turnout and espionage claims; anti-Ukrainian content stays high; no disinformation-driven violence.

  • Most dangerous (10 to 20 percent): a new incident is falsely blamed on Ukrainians within hours, backed by AI fakes, leading to protests or attacks on Ukrainians before facts are known.

  • Likely propaganda directions: "Poland the aggressor" around the espionage claims; "the state lies" around Kraków; "NATO is useless" after any drone event.


Practical points for organisations in Poland

  • Treat first reports of attacks, explosions, drones or arrests as unverified until police, prosecutors, the city or the armed forces confirm them.

  • Ask staff not to repost unverified claims, especially those that blame a nationality.

  • Give Ukrainian and other foreign staff a clear route to report harassment, and review travel near demonstrations.

  • Watch for impersonation of executives and officials with AI-generated audio or video.


Full situation report

This page is a public summary. Our complete report, with a detailed chronology, threat ratings by location and time window, conflicting claims and a forecast, is available to organisations and private clients in two editions, delivered by email within 2 hours of payment:

  • White-label edition: an editable document without GSC branding, ready for your own logo, to brief your team or your clients under your own name.

  • GSC-branded edition: a protected PDF issued under the GSC name, with editing and text copying disabled.

  • Custom report: your own topic and region, country or city, from EUR 210 net (+EUR 70 per additional topic, region or field), delivered by email within 6 hours of payment.




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